Day 15 (p. 249 to 272) Tocqueville shows how human nature plays a role in how public servants are paid and how long democracies can carry on war. His reflections on war echo Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace, in which Kant envisions the League of Nations, the United Nations and, perhaps, even the European Union.

One of the most interesting things about reading Tocqueville is seeing how his understanding of human nature plays out in his interpretation of society and institutions. When he considers the salaries of the politicians and public servants, he notes that the politicians, including high-ranking ones such as the President, are not paid very much relative to what an equivalent ranking-person would receive in a more aristocratic or monarchical government. Contrarily, the public servants, particularly the lower-ranking ones, are paid well relative to their counterparts in other types of governments. In fact, the public servants are paid a decent wage relative to an ordinary citizen in America, whereas in other governments, they are often underpaid. Meanwhile, the President and other higher positions are not given enough to match their station in life.

 

Tocqueville provides a few reasons for this, such as people being familiar with what it costs to have an ordinary life, but not really understanding what it takes to maintain a higher station. But most interestingly, he brings human nature into consideration. He notes that the people are envious of those who have been “raised above” them.  “…the secondary public officer is almost on a level with the people, whilst the others are raised above it. The former may therefore excite his interest, but the latter begins to arouse his envy (p. 250)”. People don’t like superiors. Or, at least, we don’t like people thinking they are superior. By not paying them as highly as perhaps they ought to be (compared to what a CEO of a major corporation would make), the people are essentially taking the person down a notch. It is as if we are saying, “don’t get to thinking that you are better than us, now.” If they made a lot, they might begin to see themselves as superior and it would eat us up. Low pay is essentially our way of keeping them humble. We’re not letting them get too big for their britches. Or is it just that it is coming out of our pockets as taxpayers and we don’t want to overpay?

 

Tocqueville continues, “To attribute his rise to his talents or his virtues is unpleasant; for it is tacitly to acknowledge that they are themselves less virtuous and less talented than he was (p. 261).” Again, democrats don’t like to think that anyone is better than them. Equality is the essential characteristic of a democracy, so to acknowledge, through high pay (on top of their high position), that someone is superior is to define ourselves as inferior. By keeping pay low, it is as if we are saying, “we have to elect somebody, but you are still just one of us and will be paid accordingly. You are our servant, not our master.”

 

It would be interesting to compare societies on two variables, the degree to which they are democratic and the degree to which they get agitated by high CEO salaries. Would we find that the more democratic a country, the less tolerance that nation has for high CEO pay, and vice versa? Is there a difference between a public person, such as a president, being paid well and a private person, such as CEO, being paid well? We don’t seem to mind too much that athletes or actors get paid outrageously, but we don’t like bankers getting rich. Is this because we accept that Wayne Gretzky is way better than us at hockey, but we don’t think the banker is that much better of a worker? Is that simply because it doesn’t make us feel inferior to think that we aren’t great at hockey, as who would expect everyone to be? It would be interesting to explore the psychological literature on these questions.

 

On another issue, that of willingness to wage war, Tocqueville again brings human nature into play. “There is more calculation, even in the impulses of bravery, than is generally attributed to them… (p. 263)”. Tocqueville is analyzing why democracies can’t maintain war for long periods. The people are too concerned with their immediate suffering to think about the long-term. Temporary enthusiasm for the cause may spur them to brave war for a time, but it is not enough to keep them engaged for its duration. Additionally, Tocqueville notes, “The populace is more apt to feel than to reason… (p. 264)”. The people do not use their reason to weigh the long-term consequences of their actions. If they are suffering presently from war, they want to be rid of it. They are not able to see that by making rash decisions now they may be setting themselves up for greater suffering at a later time.

 

In short, Tocqueville does not have a very high opinion of humankind, or the mass of people in a democracy. They are not noble. They are envious, foolish and more rash than brave. It is a wonder, then, that a democratic society can function at all. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that Tocqueville is generally comparing democracy with aristocracy. Of course it is a little coarser, then. But this coarseness also has its virtues, especially under certain conditions.

 

Take his analysis of a democracy’s ability to wage long wars. Do we really want countries to wage long wars? Of course not. We would like short wars, or no wars at all. Given that the people have to do the fighting and paying in a democracy, their unwillingness to do so is actually a virtue in certain circumstances. Tocqueville says as much. In a contest with a non-democratic regime, a democracy is at a disadvantage. But if all nations are democracies, people are actually better off, for all nations will be averse to war. This leads Tocqueville to conclude: “This relative impotence of democratic republics is, perhaps, the greatest obstacle to the foundation of a republic of this kind in Europe. In order that such a State should subsist in one country of the Old World, it would be necessary that similar institutions should be introduced into all the other nations (p. 264)”. Since democracies aren’t as likely to win a protracted war against a non-democracy, democracies can only exist when they border other democracies.

 

This conclusion echoes Kant’s essay, Perpetual Peace, written less than 40 years earlier. In it, Kant sketches out the conditions necessary for peace between nations, such as a league of nations. Kant also argues in favour of all nations adopting a republican form of government. It is interesting to look at Europe today compared to what it was like at the time these two were writing. Most of Europe is now democracies and the most developed nations have gone even further than a league of nations by creating the European Union. It is hard to know to what extent the ideas of people like Kant influenced human affairs and to what extent it was simply the economic conditions that impelled them to the current state of affairs (something Kant himself takes note of: ‘The guarantee of perpetual peace is nothing less than that great artist, nature [natura daedala rerum]’). Certainly the original league of nations was inspired by Kant, and the security council of the new and improved United Nations which arose from its ashes following the first World War. But peace in Europe? How much of a role did the Marshall Plan play, international trade and a greater common enemy in the Soviet Union? Not your typical nature or nurture debate. But it likely has the same answer. That is, it is surely some combination of the two.
If nurture is a part of progress, then philosophers are essential to it. Kant makes the case for tolerating philosophers and not seeing them as a threat in this gem I found at the end of the the Secret Article of Perpetual Peace, in which he argues that world leaders should have philosophers on hand to consult when considering war and peace: “That kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings is not to be expected. Nor is it to be wished, since the possession of power inevitably corrupts the untrammeled judgment of reason. But kings or kinglike peoples which rule themselves under laws of equality should not suffer the class of philosophers to disappear or to be silent, but should let them speak openly. This is indispensable to the enlightenment of the business of government, and, since the class of philosophers is by nature incapable of plotting and lobbying, it is above suspicion of being made up of propagandists”.